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Abstract: Stakeholders play a fundamental role in the governance systems  
of non-profit organisations. Their participation in decision-making  
processes – especially within governing bodies and in terms of mission 
reporting – is an essential element for effective and coherent organisation 
management. The present study carries out empirical research into Italian 
banking foundations (IBFs), a particular kind of grant-giving foundation with 
specific statutory obligations towards their stakeholders, including local 
communities and the beneficiaries of contributions. These types of foundations 
are unique, featuring characteristics that could contribute to a better 
understanding of the role played by governing bodies among third-sector 
organisations in creating a system of stakeholder engagement, participation, 
and dialogue. Using content analysis, we studied the Annual Reports and 
statutes of 88 IBFs in order to verify whether the presence of a member 
assembly in this particular type of grant-giving foundation affects the degree of 
stakeholder engagement in mission reporting. The results of our study reveal a 
greater presence of stakeholder engagement policies and practices among 
foundations with member assemblies, as well as a tendency towards 
stakeholder management in foundations without this type of governing body. 
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1 Introduction 
The role of stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Freeman and Evan, 1990) in decision-making 
processes among non-profit organisations (NPOs) has been debated in the scholarly 
literature in reference to both an organisation’s decision-making processes and to the 
relevance of their annual reports (Cornforth, 2003, 2004; De Andrés-Alonso et al., 2009; 
Gazley et al., 2010; Kreutzer, 2009; Miller-Millesen, 2003). We believe that the roles 
played by stakeholders in decision making processes within NGOs are crucial and that 
governance mechanisms should foster stakeholder engagement (SE) mechanisms in order 
to guarantee that a vast majority of stakeholders are involved in the management system. 
The influence of SE on reporting processes is particularly powerful in NPOs, since 
boards and managers are expected to answer legitimate stakeholder expectations in an 
exhaustive manner by balancing their interests and claims, while also using engagement 
policies and practices to best select which information will be shared with stakeholders 
[Middlewood and Cardno, (2001), pp.24–25]. 
We base our research on evidence gathered from 88 Italian Banking Foundations 
(IBFs) – analysing their statutes and mission reports for the year 2012 – in which a 
certain amount of stakeholder orientation is mandatory by law and where member 
assemblies can be present or absent depending on historical motivations and on the 
organisation’s individual policy. 
We also want to find out whether statutory obligation can effectively help and sustain 
the SE process, or if it simply induces ineffective behaviour. Our research question aims 
to verify whether or not the presence of a member assembly, composed of representatives 
from the local community, affects the level of SE in mission reporting. This governance 
body could guarantee, under specific conditions, a better representation of stakeholder 
interests in the foundation, with positive consequences on the quality of mission 
reporting. This study, in short, might help determine which governance model can 
guarantee a better representation of diverse stakeholder interests in NPOs and related 
accountability mechanisms. 
We believe that this type of research is innovative both at the academic and 
professional level because it can confirm or deny some common assumptions regarding 
the role of governance models in NPOs. Our study will: 
• describe the role of stakeholders in the governance and reporting processes of NPOs 
and IBFs, illustrating the main characteristics of the latter 
• carry out an empirical analysis on all of the IBFs in order to verify whether the 
presence of a member assembly in the governance structure affects the intensity of 
SE in mission reporting 
• discuss the main results of the survey 
• present our research conclusions, the limitations of our study, and further research. 
2 Italian banking foundations 
IBFs constitute a particular type of grant-giving, not-for-profit foundation (Pedrini and 
Minciullo, 2011) that is unique to Italy due to its rules governing stakeholder orientation 
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obligations. Currently, IBFs are primarily engaged in the areas of art and culture, 
assistance to the underprivileged, education, support to voluntary organisations, 
healthcare, and scientific research. They operate in their own community for statutory 
reasons, and only rarely act in adjacent districts. IBFs do not have owners, but, according 
to Italian law, local governments (municipalities and provinces) and local private entities 
(voluntary organisations, the dioceses of the Catholic church, professional and trade 
associations, and universities) typically appoint the members of the board of governors, 
their most important body. As the supervising authority, the Italian Ministry of Economy 
and Finance (MEF) prescribes investment guidelines and special tax status. 
IBFs came into existence following the privatisation of the Italian banking sector, 
which began in 1990 with Law 218 (the so called ‘Amato law’). The legislators who 
drafted this law decided to transform state-owned banks into limited companies and to 
transfer their shares to newly formed not-for-profit foundations that had previously been 
pursuing public interest, economic development, and social usefulness initiatives. 
Law 218 separated banking functions from philanthropic activities. In 1998, the 
legislature passed a subsequent law, the ‘Ciampi’ Law, which completed the 
transformation of ‘conferring entities’ into full-fledged, endowed, private foundations 
that were separated from their banks (except as minority shareholders) and fully 
empowered to act on their own authority to pursue public benefit and economic 
development objectives with their much enhanced assets and earnings. Since 1998 these 
foundations have been recognised by the Italian Constitutional Courts as private 
organisations. 
While savings banks were established as private, commercial, profit making 
institutions that are subjected to the same regulations and laws governing banking and 
financial functions, IBFs engaged in philanthropic activities that focused on social, civil, 
and economic development. IBFs were initially the major shareholders in these newly 
created banking institutions. The participation of IBFs in the corporation stock of saving 
banks have been significantly reduced through the years to the point where they are no 
longer the principle shareholders. There are 88 IBFs differing in provenance, size, and 
local activity. Nonetheless, all are tasked with promoting development, especially within 
the territories where they are based and have deep roots. This role is carried out in two 
ways: as institutions that provide philanthropic resources both to NPOs and to local 
beneficiaries, and as important institutional investors (Monteduro et al., 2010). 
IBFs are seen as a guiding force within Italy’s third sector, especially among 
voluntary organisations. According to Salamon (2010), “the experience of the Italian 
foundations of banking origin has illuminated an alternative route to amassing charitable 
assets that is gaining increased attention throughout the world, a route that I have called 
‘Philanthropication thru Privatization’” (p.1). This experience “has opened our eyes to a 
new form of alchemy in which privatization can be used not only to transform public, or 
quasi-public, assets into for-profit companies, but to produce charitable gold in the 
process” [Salamon, (2010), p.2]. Salomon goes on to argue that IBFs have helped build 
independent charitable endowments, contributing not only to the improvement of the 
quality of life in Italy, but also to the promotion of charity on a global scale (Salamon, 
2014). Thus, IBFs, in cooperation with the funded NPOs, play an important role in the 
development of Italian civil society and economy, especially at the local level. They are 
private entities that pursue finalities of public interest by raising new resources, designing 
new services, and encouraging empowerment and participation (Monteduro et al., 2010). 
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The resources used for these philanthropic grants come from income generated by 
capital investments. Only a small part of these investments are generated from banking 
activities; the majority of them originate in medium/fixed term assets (shares and public 
and private bonds), especially within sectors that are already receiving donations, thus 
substantially increasing the resources available to them. 
IBFs are well organised to handle the many challenges that the third sector is facing 
throughout the western world, including the increasing demands for private welfare 
services; the diversification of social needs; the greater demands for transparency and 
accountability; the shift from philanthropy to sponsorship; and the shift from operating 
funds to project-based funding (Bugg and Dallhoff, 2006). According to Italian law, IBFs 
operate mainly in the areas of art and culture, social care, education, volunteering, 
scientific research, and human health, and can direct their activities exclusively to the 
local community. Only in rare cases are they allowed the possibility of extending their 
operations into neighbouring communities. 
Historically, some Italian savings banks had institutional origins (meaning that they 
were founded by local community entities) while others had associative origins (meaning 
that they were created as anonymous societies with capital contributed by private 
citizens). Moreover, the vast majority of savings banks (69 of 88) had established 
assemblies well before the reforms of the 1990s. Some banking foundations (41 of 69) 
decided to maintain their membership base, while others decided against it (28 of 69). 
IBFs represent a unique source of data because of the originality of their governance 
structure, which can be replicated – with appropriate adjustments – in countries other 
than Italy. They tend to consist of four basic bodies: 
• The board of governors, whose task is to identify the priorities, objectives, and 
programmes of the foundation. It also carries out essential functions of modifying 
and approving statutes, nominating and removing members of the executive 
committee and the audit committee, verifying results, and approving annual reports 
and defining guidelines for asset management. 
• The executive committee, which carries out ordinary and extraordinary management, 
proposes and enables foundation activities, manages assets and makes donations 
needed to carry out statutory aims, and undertakes management control. 
• The members’ assembly, which is only found in foundations with a membership 
origin, is nominated and formed according to statute. Its main tasks are to nominate a 
non-majority quota of members of the board of governors and to put forward 
suggestions to other organs. 
• The audit committee, which is made up of professional auditors whose task is to 
oversee management, accounts control, and proper administration. 
Thus, IBFs are different in their historical origins and in their correlated governance 
structure from other types of grant-giving foundations. The presence of a member 
assembly is unique and original, and clearly divides IBFs into two different groups. This 
observation is at the basis of our research question. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
There is evidence to suggest that an optimal governance model for foundations doesn’t 
(or cannot) exist (De Andrés-Alonso et al., 2009). Recent scholarship, in fact, suggests 
that there is no single model of board governance, that “one size does not fit all”, and that 
context matters in both corporate governance (Coles et al., 2008; Faleye, 2007) and in a 
non-profit context (Robinson, 2001; Ostrower and Stone, 2006). Wellens and Jegers 
(2014) argue that it is appropriate that beneficiaries of activities or donations are involved 
in organisational policymaking (e.g., Ospina et al., 2002) because people have the right to 
be involved in decisions that affect their daily lives and because governments attach 
increasing importance to organisations that strive to forge a close relationship with their 
beneficiaries (Balser and McClusky, 2005; Van Puyvelde et al., 2012). At the same time, 
several researchers refer to a certain amount of wariness among stakeholders towards 
mechanisms involving beneficiaries in NPO governance (Dom and Verhoeven, 2006; 
O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2009). The scholarly literature also suggests that some 
stakeholders question the beneficiaries’ representativeness and/or the beneficiaries’ 
competence to positively influence NPOs’ management (e.g., Cornwall, 2008). 
Furthermore, several scholars underline the challenge of finding an equilibrium between 
the needs, expectations, and objectives of diverse stakeholder categories (e.g., Brown, 
2002; Guo and Musso, 2007). The difficulties in achieving balance between diverse 
stakeholders could prevent NPOs from becoming beneficiary-driven. 
Nonetheless, some studies (Bess et al., 2009; Mandel and Qazilbash, 2005; Wellens 
and Jegers, 2014) have shown the positive effects that beneficiary engagement can bring 
to the NPO to the beneficiaries involved in strategy and policy development, and to the 
beneficiaries as a stakeholder category. These positive outcomes include increased 
effectiveness of services, the better achievement of the NPO’s goals, the strengthening of 
its legitimacy, the improvement of NPO board member commitment, organisational 
learning and growth, the increase of the organisation’s social capital, and many other 
factors. Of course, all of these results are reachable only if the organisation is able to 
balance and give an order of priority to the diverse expectations of different stakeholders, 
not only across stakeholder groups but also among stakeholders of the same category, 
many of which have conflicting goals. Though all stakeholders should be involved, this 
does not prevent an organisation from prioritising their relationships with various 
stakeholders. Mitchell et al. (1997) argue that the salience of stakeholders, or the degree 
to which their arguments were taken into account, depends upon the stakeholder 
possessing three attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. In other words, it is not 
compulsory or necessary to consider all groups or singular stakeholders in a group at the 
same level of relevance and importance. 
NPOs should try to implement governance mechanisms that act as dialogic 
communication platforms with their key stakeholders, especially beneficiaries and local 
communities (Wellens and Jegers, 2014). The more NPOs are accountable to multiple 
stakeholder categories at the same time, the more effective NPOs will be perceived. As a 
result, SE should be conducted on a fairly regular basis, as aims, needs, and expectations 
can change over time (Herman and Renz, 2004, 2008; Wellens and Jegers, 2014). NPOs 
can delegate decisional and executive power to representatives of stakeholders, 
embedding them in the governing bodies, thus creating an authentic multi-stakeholder 
model of governance [Middlewood and Cardno, (2001), pp.24–25; Swanson, 2013]. 
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Some scholars also suggest giving appointed and even elected trustees more of a 
stake in the organisation’s mission, if only because “a system of resource-based 
stakeholder governance would introduce a new dynamic, increasing the incentives for 
board members to enhance various sources of organizational support to gain more 
control over the organization’s agenda” [Young, (2011), p.583; see also: Campi and 
others, 2006; Evers and Laville, 2004; Mancino and Thomas, 2005; Mersland, 2011]. 
Managers should report and communicate (internally and externally) using 
engagement policies and practices to select relevant and material information for 
stakeholders. After all, accountability instruments can be an effective mechanism for 
balancing and adjusting conflicting stakeholder interests [Ebrahim, (2003b), p.194; Gray 
and others, 2006; Dixon and others, 2006; Ebrahim, 2005, 2003a; Najam, 1996; Unerman 
and O’Dwyer, 2006). 
The scholarly literature also suggests that in NPOs – where there are no special 
relationships with specific categories of stakeholders – consequences and pressures on 
accountability systems are more relevant. This is due to several reasons: 
1 The absence of shareholders in the traditional sense makes stakeholder theory a 
viable perspective from which to understand accountability to multiple stakeholders, 
due to the fact that power differentials in capital and factor markets and in regulation 
mean that differing interests need to be implicitly or explicitly prioritised [Collier, 
(2008), p.935; Mulgan, (2000), p.124; Murtaza, 2012]. 
2 In the third and quasi-public sectors, organisations need to ensure their survival and 
success in the long term by directly satisfying all stakeholders [Collier, 2008; 
Woodward and Marshall, (2004), p.124; Costa et al., 2011]. 
3 When the goal of profits is not a focus, accountability can have more than just 
economic importance (Dawson and Dunn, 2006). Stakeholder theory offers 
organisations, especially non-profit ones, a way of identifying and reconciling 
disparate stakeholder interests by recognising organisational obligations to wider and 
more ethically concerned constituencies (Simmons, 2004). 
Since civil society and the public sector has changed significantly over the last two 
decades, especially in Western countries, accountability is becoming a critical issue in the 
management and governance of third sector organisations worldwide [Benjamin, (2008), 
p.201; Lee, 2004; Bendell, 2005]. Accountability instruments can represent an effective 
mechanism for balancing and adjusting conflicting stakeholder interests (Gray et al., 
2006; Owen et al., 2001) and for confirming their public utility and advocacy activities, 
thereby legitimising their presence in the community (Bagnoli and Megali, 2011). 
Some scholars have also claimed that introducing mandatory reporting on various 
topics (e.g., on social or environmental issues) improves the quantity and the quality of 
information that is provided to users. This is especially true with reference to negative 
performance and the impacts caused by the reporting organisations (Deegan and Rankin, 
1996; Frost, 2007). However, there is little evidence demonstrating the actual usefulness 
of reporting this information to users (Clarkson et al., 2011; Cowan and Gadenne; 2005; 
Uchida, 2007). 
We assume that the process of SE in external reporting is present in NPOs, especially 
when the law requires them to account for the organisation’s activities in a mission 
report. Of course, the quality of this kind of engagement is questionable, since the 
literature indicates that actions that are compulsory by law do not always produce high 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Does the presence of member assemblies in grant-giving foundations affect 125    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
quality outcomes for both the organisation and its stakeholders (Gumb, 2007). In this 
study we want to determine if the presence of a member assembly, composed of 
representatives from the local community and civil society, influences the levels of SE in 
mission reporting. Our hypothesis is that the presence of a member assembly that is 
composed of relevant stakeholders (e.g., local community and beneficiaries) – taking into 
consideration other governance mechanisms and the entity’s size – improves the quality 
of SE in the mandatory mission reporting of IBFs. The verification of this hypothesis 
could shed light on possible governance models that might be able to improve the level of 
SE in annual reporting, thus enhancing the relevance of information disclosed and 
answering the call for a better accountability among NPOs and especially grant-giving 
foundations. 
4 Methodology 
IBFs have a legal and statutory requirement to report the results of their activities in an 
annual report. Under Italian law, IBFs have to publish an annual report that includes a 
special section dedicated to “defining social objectives pursued by the foundation and 
projects carried out, underlining the results achieved for the different classes of 
receivers” (art. 9 Decree Law 153/99). This part of report is usually referred to as a 
‘mission report’, a basic element of foundation accounting documents. The mission 
report describes the projects that are funded by the foundation. All information and data 
are given to the primary beneficiaries, who are considered a particularly important type of 
external stakeholder. The mission report includes, among other things, compulsory 
sections on stakeholder mapping, statutory organs, the main governance and management 
processes, and the donation process itself. Our study concentrates on these sections, with 
the aim of discovering some key elements of SE in mission reporting. We collected and 
analysed all 88 IBF mission reports for 2012. All of these reports contain information and 
data on SE policies and practices in mission reporting due to legal or statutory 
obligations. The IBFs are mainly membership-based (69 of 88), but only 41 of these have 
kept the members assembly (41 of 69). IBFs have been classified on the basis of their net 
assets, using the criterion proposed by the Italian Association of Saving Banks (ACRI, 
2013). In terms of the size of IBFs (net assets), it is interesting to note that the medium- 
to large-sized foundations frequently did not have a members’ assembly, while a majority 
of the remaining foundations did. The foundations’ total donations are primarily 
distributed within the following sectors: art and culture, social services, research, 
education, instruction and training, and voluntary, philanthropic and charitable projects. 
Considering the intrinsic characteristics of IBFs, we used content analysis in order to 
examine the possible correlation between the presence of the member assembly and the 
levels of SE in mission reporting. Content analysis is a method widely adopted in 
corporate disclosure studies (Guthrie et al., 2004) because it allows repeatability and 
valid inferences from data according to their context (Krippendorf, 1980). Neuendorf 
(2002) defines content analysis as a quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the 
scientific method and is not limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or 
the context in which the messages are created or presented. Content analysis is a 
scholarly methodology in the social sciences and humanities in which texts are studied as 
to authorship, authenticity, or meaning. It is conceived as a technique for making 
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inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of 
messages (Holsti, 1969). 
The research team was composed of a senior researcher (an associate professor who 
was also the coordinator of the team) and two junior researchers (PhD students). On the 
basis of the research questions mentioned above, a list of detection and classification 
rules was defined and discussed with the research team, and classification criteria for 
each dimension of the research questions were subsequently identified. We decided to 
analyse SE in mission reporting using 7 survey items. Stakeholder participation was 
determined by using an intensity (Likert) scale on three levels with the exception of a 
dichotomous answer (Yes/No) for the first item. The first item, in fact, was used to 
determine whether the document contains a stakeholder mapping. Meanwhile, the other 
items (2–7) were used to determine the intensity of the information provided by IBFs in 
the simplest and most objective way, taking into account absence, presence, or partial 
disclosure. We decided upon an unusual Likert scale because the sample is small  
(88 reports from 88 foundations) and we want to have sufficient observations in the cells 
while guaranteeing a high level of inter-rater reliability. 
Data was collected in such a way as to highlight, for each item, the difference – if  
any – in levels of SE in foundations with or without a member assembly (and with or 
without a membership origin). This enabled us to verify any significant correlations 
between the diverse governance structures and the levels of SE in mission reporting in the 
analysed sample. 
Some tests of the coding procedure were conducted to highlight ambiguous or unclear 
interpretations of coding rules. Three 2011 mission reports of IBFs were independently 
examined by each member of the research group. The results were compared and 
differences of interpretation were discussed. This resulted in a final set of detection and 
classification rules for information contained in the documents. Finally, the revised 
procedure was tested on another 2011 mission report - this time by the whole research 
group – to align the conduct of all research team members (this resulted in a Cohen’s 
kappa coefficient of inter-reliability of 0.8). The next step was to distribute the 
documents for content analysis among the various team members (coordinator excepted), 
dividing the workload in such a way as to ensure that each member had a chance to 
analyse reports of every type of foundation in terms of dimensions, governance structure, 
and territorial belonging. The coordinator afterwards compared the results obtained by 
the other members, checking that there were no differences of interpretation with regards 
to the research questions. 
Our survey form (Table 1) sought to analyse the level of SE in foundation mission 
reporting by studying information contained in the annual reports. First, we established 
the existence of stakeholder mapping (item 1) and any classification of stakeholders 
based on predetermined criteria of priority (item 6). Next, we verified whether social 
objectives pursued, projects carried out, and results obtained were divided according to 
the various stakeholder categories (items 2, 3, and 4). We also endeavoured to establish if 
the mission report had been drawn up after previous consultation with stakeholders in 
order to define the information needed to satisfy their information requirements (item 5). 
Lastly, we examined the attention paid by the foundation to stakeholder participation in 
the process of continuous improvement, verifying which instruments were used to gather 
stakeholder opinions on previous reports (item 7). 
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Table 1 Survey form on SE in the foundation mission report (Section 2 of the management 
report): seven items and possible answers with their scores 
Items Scores 
1 Does the document contain a stakeholder/receiver mapping? Yes (2), No (0) 
2 Are the social objectives differentiated with reference to the various 
stakeholder/receiver categories? 
Yes (2); Only  
Partially (1); No (0) 
3 Are projects carried out differentiated with reference to the various 
stakeholder/receiver categories? 
Yes (2); Only  
Partially (1); No (0) 
4 Does the mission report differentiate results achieved with reference 
to the various stakeholder/receiver categories? 
Yes (2); Only  
Partially (1); No (0) 
5 Is the mission report drawn up by consulting stakeholders/receivers 
regarding their information requirements and requests? 
Yes (2); Only  
Partially (1); No (0) 
6 Are priority stakeholder/receiver categories distinguished from the 
others according to suitable criteria [e.g. power, legitimacy, and 
urgency, as in the model of Mitchell et al. (1997)]? 
Yes (2); Only  
Partially (1); No (0) 
7 Were stakeholders/receivers asked their opinion of the mission 
report, for example, using a satisfaction questionnaire? 
Yes (2); Only  
Partially (1); No (0) 
In order to evaluate the correlation between the presence/absence of member assemblies 
in IBFs and the level of SE in their mission reports, we attribute the scores indicated in 
Table 2 to the presence/absence of member assemblies and items 1–7 of our SE survey in 
mission reporting. The final scoring of SE in mission reporting is indicated in the last 
column. 
Table 2 Results of our content analysis on 2012 IBF annual reports: membership origin, 
current presence of a member assembly, net assets, answers to the items of our survey 
form, and SE scores 
Foundation 




With (1) or 




Net assets I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 SE scores 
1 0 0 6,550,955,301 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 3 
2 0 0 5,621,663,693 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 
3 1 0 2,658,394,150 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
4 1 0 1,916,583,003 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 5 
5 1 0 1,745,077,193 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 9 
6 1 1 1,444,712,622 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 9 
7 1 0 1,330,164,010 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 5 
8 1 1 1,304,571,348 0 1 2 2 2 0 0 7 
9 1 1 1,182,732,873 1 2 2 2 2 1 0 10 
10 1 0 1,012,613,126 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
11 0 0 874,777,758 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 4 
12 1 0 868,407,202 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 6 
13 1 0 833,500,241 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 6 
14 1 0 825,004,991 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 5 
15 0 0 792,044,475 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 3 
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Table 2 Results of our content analysis on 2012 IBF annual reports: membership origin, 
current presence of a member assembly, net assets, answers to the items of our survey 
form, and SE scores (continued) 
Foundation 




With (1) or 




Net assets I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 SE scores 
16 1 1 756,716,175 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 9 
17 1 1 731,497,545 1 1 1 2 2 1 0 8 
18 1 0 626,625,444 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 7 
19 1 1 581,024,824 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 11 
20 1 1 530,694,977 1 1 2 2 1 1 0 8 
21 1 0 447,765,897 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 9 
22 1 1 433,278,852 1 2 2 2 2 1 0 10 
23 1 0 377,510,666 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 6 
24 1 0 372,164,429 1 2 2 2 0 2 0 9 
25 1 1 347,487,632 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 10 
26 1 0 328,546,685 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 11 
27 0 0 323,148,235 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 3 
28 0 0 319,246,229 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 4 
29 1 1 276,247,007 1 2 2 2 0 1 0 8 
30 1 1 236,004,187 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 9 
31 1 0 224,263,026 0 2 1 1 2 0 0 6 
32 1 0 220,250,043 0 1 2 2 2 0 0 7 
33 0 0 217,837,525 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 
34 1 0 209,825,086 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 6 
35 1 1 209,196,050 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 8 
36 1 1 208,366,802 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 8 
37 0 0 204,491,034 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 
38 0 0 200,564,133 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 4 
39 1 1 191,700,071 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 12 
40 1 1 186,647,484 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 
41 1 1 182,367,210 0 2 2 2 2 1 0 9 
42 0 0 178,785,064 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 3 
43 1 0 171,582,874 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 6 
44 1 1 163,769,382 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 10 
45 1 0 162,659,517 1 2 2 2 2 0 2 11 
46 1 1 162,642,052 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 7 
47 1 1 161,598,256 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 8 
48 1 1 156,199,200 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 11 
49 1 0 154,637,960 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 6 
50 1 1 151,363,000 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 9 
51 1 1 137,902,159 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 7 
52 1 1 137,364,808 1 2 2 2 2 1 0 10 
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Table 2 Results of our content analysis on 2012 IBF annual reports: membership origin, 
current presence of a member assembly, net assets, answers to the items of our survey 
form, and SE scores (continued) 
Foundation 




With (1) or 




Net assets I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 SE scores 
53 0 0 131,805,343 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 
54 1 0 126,860,247 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 6 
55 0 0 123,037,916 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 
56 1 0 122,615,896 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 7 
57 1 1 120,835,056 0 1 2 2 1 0 0 6 
58 1 0 120,161,697 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 5 
59 1 0 118,568,933 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 6 
60 1 1 112,544,159 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 9 
61 1 1 104,325,991 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 7 
62 1 1 101,021,905 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 9 
63 1 1 92,405,319 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 
64 1 1 91,508,942 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 8 
65 1 1 89,343,331 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 6 
66 1 1 88,955,561 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
67 1 1 81,801,208 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 9 
68 1 0 79,619,573 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 5 
69 0 0 76,852,266 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 
70 0 0 75,481,348 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 4 
71 1 1 73,075,344 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 7 
72 1 1 67,503,833 1 1 2 2 1 0 1 8 
73 1 1 55,639,861 1 1 2 2 1 1 0 8 
74 0 0 55,492,926 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
75 1 0 51,502,581 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 4 
76 1 1 47,456,845 1 2 2 2 1 0 0 8 
77 1 1 42,187,787 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 7 
78 1 0 39,614,297 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 6 
79 1 1 36,232,977 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 9 
80 1 1 35,984,581 1 1 2 2 1 1 0 8 
81 1 0 35,033,886 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
82 0 0 32,633,599 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
83 1 1 29,941,318 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 7 
84 1 1 27,837,781 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 8 
85 0 0 25,909,789 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 4 
86 0 0 17,432,487 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 4 
87 0 0 6,910,549 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 5 
88 1 0 1,731,364 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 6 
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In the second column we indicated the dummy 0 for the foundations without a 
membership origin and the dummy 1 for foundations with this origin. In the third column 
we indicated the dummy 0 for the foundations without a current member assembly and 
dummy 1 for the foundations with a current member assembly. 
For the first item of the SE survey, we chose scores 0 and 1 (absence of stakeholder 
mapping = 0; presence of stakeholder mapping = 1), while in all the other items (2–7) we 
chose the scores 0, 1, and 2 for the possible answers to our survey, according to a scale 
articulated in three levels (no = 0; only partially = 1; yes = 2). After that we determined 
the total scoring of SE in mission reporting as the sum of the scores in items 1–7. 
Foundations in the sample obtained a minimum score of 0 (one case) and a maximum 
score of 12 (one case). The mean and median values are both 7, while the standard 
deviation is 2.58. We also collected data on the level of net assets in 2012 (fourth 
column). The main findings of our content analysis on 2012 IBF mission reports are 
illustrated in Table 2. 
5 Results 
Table 3 shows mean and standard deviations in the levels of SE among foundations 
without a membership origin, foundations with a membership origin but without a 
member assembly, and foundations with a member assembly. A one-way Anova was 
conducted in order to compare SE levels among the different types of foundations. 
Significant differences emerged among the three groups (F2, 85 = 54.612, p <.001). The 
Scheffè test was used in order to compare all three groups. Foundations with member 
assemblies showed significantly higher levels of SE compared to both foundations that 
have a membership origin but no assembly, and foundations without a membership origin 
(mean difference was, respectively, 2.22 and 4.98, p < .001). On the other hand, 
foundations with a membership origin but without a member assembly showed higher 
levels of SE compared to foundations that do not have a membership origin (mean 
difference 2.76). 
Table 3 SE levels among the different types of foundations 
 N M SD 
Foundations without a membership origin 19 3.32 .75 
Foundations with a membership origin but without a member assembly 28 6.07 2.36 
Foundations with a member assembly 41 8.29 1.55 
Total 88 6.51 2.59 
A hierarchical multiple regression was performed in which the SE total score was taken 
as the dependent variable. At step 1, the variable ‘net assets’ was entered into the model. 
At step 2, the variable ‘member assembly’ was added. Table 4 shows the results of the 
hierarchical regression analysis, which was computed in order to determine if a model 
constituted by net assets and the presence of a member assembly can predict SE levels. 
The presence of net assets explains a statistically insignificant 0.4% of the variance in SE 
levels. After controlling for size (net assets), the inclusion of the member assembly adds a 
significant amount of variance in the previous amount (R2 = .421, p = .001, ΔR2 = .381, 
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p<.001). Squared semi-partial correlations indicated that a member assembly accounted 
for 38% of the total variance in SE levels. 
Table 4 Hierarchical regression analysis with SE levels as dependent variable and the presence 
of net assets and member assembly (n = 41) as predictors 
Model β t Model R2 ΔR2 
(Constant)     Step 1 
Net assets –.201 –1.898 .040 --- 
(Constant)     
Net assets –.076 –.902 
Step 2 
Member assembly 
(No = 0; Yes = 1) 
.630* 7.480 
.421** .408 
Note: *p < .001 
Based on this evidence, our hypothesis that the presence of member assembly composed 
of relevant stakeholders improves the quality of SE in the mandatory mission reporting of 
IBFs is confirmed. Furthermore, we found that statutory obligation can effectively help 
and sustain the SE process in accountability mechanisms among IBFs. 
These results can be explained by noting that the presence of a member assembly, 
which allows for the participation of both beneficiaries and representatives from the local 
community, allows for greater engagement of specific stakeholder categories, since many 
local community representatives are already present in the governance structure. A 
similar phenomena is observable in foundations that have a membership origin but no 
member assembly. This suggests an inclination towards engagement that is linked with 
historical and cultural motivations. Thus, since beneficiaries and local communities 
represent the ‘salient’ stakeholders for IBFs, we could affirm – with a reasonable degree 
of approximation – that engagement of priority stakeholders in mission reporting is more 
effective among small and medium foundations with a membership origin and/or with a 
member assembly. 
Until 20 years ago these foundations had a strong relationship with representatives of 
diverse stakeholder categories from within the local community. As a result, they have 
maintained a positive attitude towards robust communication strategies and the 
involvement of local people. It is also interesting to note that the majority of foundations 
with a membership origin and/or with a member assembly have small- or medium-sized 
net assets. This suggests that small and medium IBFs are more likely to have a close 
relationship with their local stakeholders because the latter can be reached more easily in 
small and medium entities that operate in smaller communities than in large foundations 
that operate in larger communities. 
Finally, despite the fact that the IBF reports were all drawn up in accordance with 
ACRI guidelines (they explicitly indicate the need to address the mission report to the 
main beneficiaries of the IBF’s financial contributions), we can also confirm that mission 
reports issued by foundations without a membership origin lacked some fundamental 
aspects of the SE process, even though the phase of management and reconciliation of the 
stakeholders’ various expectations was undoubtedly dealt with. 
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6 Conclusions 
The primary aim of the present research was to understand whether (and how) a 
membership origin or the presence of a member assembly in the governance structure of 
IBFs affects the levels of SE in mission reporting. We can affirm that: 
• foundations with member assemblies present higher levels of SE in mission reporting 
in comparison to the two other types of foundations; 
• foundations with a membership origin present higher levels of SE in mission 
reporting in comparison to foundations without this origin; 
• the foundation’s dimension, measured using the amount of net assets, doesn’t affect 
the level of SE as described above. 
Our research has shown that the quality of reporting, in terms of the relevance of 
information disclosed, is reasonable in foundations with a member assembly and limited 
in the other types of IBFs. In fact, among entities that do not have member assemblies 
mission reporting seems to be based on a stakeholder management outlook rather than on 
effective SE, which calls for reciprocal commitment on all sides in defining report 
contents (Manetti, 2011). The scholarly literature suggests that the expression 
‘stakeholder management’ is used to refer to organisations that try to manage 
stakeholders’ expectations and the claims and issues that they support, balancing a host of 
diverse positions (O’Dwyer, 2005). Conversely, the expression ‘SE’ refers to an attempt 
to involve primary stakeholders in decision-making processes, making them participants 
of the organisation’s management and governance, sharing information, dialoguing, and 
creating a model of mutual responsibility. The main feature of SE, therefore, is not the 
mere involvement of stakeholders in order to ‘mitigate’ or manage their expectations 
(stakeholder management), but to create a network of mutual responsibility [Andriof  
and Waddock, (2002), p.15; Unerman and Bennett, 2004; Voss et al., 2005; Windsor,  
(2002), p.138]. 
In conclusion, if stakeholders have responsibilities and rights, then their interest in the 
relationship with the organisation goes beyond merely satisfying their expectations. In 
other words, their interest is also defined by their relationship with the organisation and 
the other partners with whom they interact. Given that foundations with member 
assemblies often represent the community and primary local stakeholders, with 
reasonable representation from the various categories of priority stakeholders – e.g., trade 
associations and Catholic and third sector organisations – it seems that some form of 
attention is often paid to ‘salient’ stakeholders before the preparation of the annual report. 
According to our research, reasonable levels of stakeholder participation in 
organisations obliged by law to engage stakeholders in decision-making processes are 
present only in foundations with member assemblies, while stakeholder management 
policies and practices are often found among IBFs without a membership origin. 
Foundations without a member assembly but with a membership origin are characterised 
by a prevalence of stakeholder management practices on those of real and effective SE. 
Among the limitations of this present study, we note that it would be advisable to go 
beyond content analysis of annual reports by carrying out structured or semi-structured 
interviews with directors, managers, and stakeholder representatives. By engaging in 
direct consultation with these people, we might be able to better determine the quality of 
stakeholder participation. This could be very important in verifying a propensity among 
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IBFs for SE that is not declared in the annual reports for specific reasons, including 
privacy policies, lack of awareness about requirements, strategic opportunities of 
accountability systems, and especially annual reporting systems. At the same time, these 
types of interviews might reveal lower levels of SE than were declared in annual reports, 
thus confirming or denying the conclusions of the present study. 
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